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he rise of claims trading is one of the most
important changes in bankruptcy practice
over the past 30 years. Many critics contend
that claims trading has made chapter 11 much harder to administer. Chapter 11 is built on the assumption that the debtor will have lengthy and contentious negotiations with creditors that ultimately
culminate in a consensual settlement and a fully
supported reorganization plan.
However, chapter 11 practice began to drift further and further away from this classic paradigm in
the late 1990s, as, so the story goes, a robust secondary market developed in the debt and equity of
chapter 11 debtors. Some creditors decided not to
negotiate with debtors and instead sold their claims
to a new type of investor that both helped to create the secondary market and grew along with it:
distressed hedge funds that specialize in activist
investing in chapter 11. Over the years, there have
been many calls to change bankruptcy law or practice to accommodate what many see as a disruptive
change, including an ABI Journal article.1
In a recent paper, 2 the author conducted the
first empirical study of the one of the largest markets for bankruptcy claims: trading in the corporate bonds issued by chapter 11 debtors. The
study relied on the entire record of bond-trading
for all chapter 11 debtors that filed for bankruptcy
between 2002-12, which were then matched to
important dates and case information from the
court dockets. The data source used for the study
has a key limitation, however.3
First, a note about the author’s methodology.
Consider a hypothetical trade of a small amount of
a bond issued by a debtor prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy. Assume that one hedge fund sells the right to
receive $100 from the debtor to another investor for
$10 (or 10 cents on the dollar) on March 1, 2005. In
the dataset, the author observed the fact that a trade
of $100 of the debtor’s bond issue happened on
March 1, 2005, with a sale price of $10. However,
the author is unaware of the buyer or seller’s identity. While this limits the empirical conclusions,
1 See, e.g., Aaron L. Hammer and Michael A. Brandess, “Claims Trading: The Wild West
of Chapter 11s,” XXIX ABI Journal No. 6: cover, 62-64, July/August 2010, available at
abi.org/abi-journal (unless otherwise specified, all links in this article were last visited
on Oct. 22, 2018).
2 Jared A. Ellias, “Bankruptcy Claims Trading,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (forthcoming 2018), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215701.
3 The study relies on the FINRA TRACE dataset, which is a record of all over-the-counter
secondary market transactions in fixed income securities, as reported by FINRA member
broker-dealers.
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the data can still be informative about bankruptcy
claims-trading.
This article summarizes some of the study’s
main findings. As further explained herein, the
author found that the market for chapter 11
bonds is very active but perhaps less important
for the administration of bankruptcy law than
many critics have feared.
The chapter 11 bond sample consists of all
bonds issued by chapter 11 debtors that traded
while the issuing firm was operating in chapter 11,
or 389,154 individual trades on 54,536 trading days
in 494 bonds issued by 204 firms with an aggregate
face value of $512 billion and an aggregate market
value of approximately $280 billion. These bonds
often trade at a substantial discount to par, which
explains the difference between the face value and
market value of the trades. As the numbers suggest,
the chapter 11 bond market is a large market.
One important question is how active the market for chapter 11 debt actually is. While the literature commonly speaks of a “robust” secondary
market, it is also common for courts and commentators to assume that chapter 11 debt trades in an
“illiquid” market. Obviously, both descriptions are
right some of the time, but the advantage of this
empirical approach is that it enables the author to
say on average who is right more often. On average, 94 percent of chapter 11 debtors that file for
bankruptcy with outstanding bond debt experience
trading in their bonds while the firm is in chapter 11. In fact, chapter 11 bonds average among the
most heavily traded bonds in the corporate bond
market as a whole. The median chapter 11 bond
experiences turnover during the bankruptcy case —
where turnover is defined as the total volume of
trading scaled by the face value of the bond — that
places it in the top 15 percent of all outstanding
corporate bonds. In other words, the median chapter 11 bond trades more actively than 85 percent of
the corporate bond market.
While most chapter 11 bonds are actively traded,
the sample reveals a wide distribution of trading.
For the median bond, aggregate trading is equivalent to more than 113 percent of the outstanding face
value of the bond between the petition date and the
approval of a reorganization plan. This is not to say
that 113 percent of petition date holders of the bond
sold their claim to a new investor. As the author did
not observe the identity of the traders, one cannot
ABI Journal

know whether one is observing, for example, three trades of
approximately 40 percent of the issue with the other 60 percent held by a patient investor, or whether 113 percent of the
bond issue traded once.
The tails of distributions are very different than the medians, with the 25th percentile bond only seeing 27 percent
aggregate turnover and the 75th percentile bond seeing more
than 345 percent aggregate turnover during that same period.
Thus, while the majority of chapter 11 cases involve heavy
trading, the level of trading in the most actively traded bonds
is qualitatively different from the median case.
Trading also appears, on average, to be the heaviest at
the beginning of the bankruptcy case. On average, 3 percent
of an outstanding bond issue trades on every trading day
between a firm’s petition date and the approval of debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing. Trading drops sharply, to about
1 percent of the outstanding bond issue, for every day of the
case subsequent to the approval of DIP financing, and the
average level of trading falls again once the disclosure statement has been approved. This pattern of trading suggests
that, on average, the market for chapter 11 debt is most active
relatively early in the bankruptcy process.
An interesting pattern in the data is that trading across
levels of a firm’s capital structure is relatively uncorrelated. To illustrate, consider a firm with senior bonds and
subordinated bonds. In general, the level of trading in the
senior bonds does not predict the level of trading in the
subordinated bonds, and vice versa. On the other hand,
when multiple bond issues are outstanding at the same
level of claim priority — for example, two issues of senior
unsecured bonds — trading in those bonds is highly correlated. This pattern suggests that traders tend to focus on
one level of a firm’s capital structure at any given time.
Trading does not appear to be statistically significantly
heavier in the bonds that receive a distribution of equity at
the end of the bankruptcy case, as opposed to bonds that
receive a distribution of cash or debt.
These results demonstrate that there is an active market for the claims of chapter 11 debtors, but an important
question remains unanswered: How much value (if any) are
selling claimholders giving up by selling their claims? The
classic story of bankruptcy claims-trading involves the sale
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of claims issued by bankrupt firms from traditional institutional investors to nontraditional investors, such as hedge
funds, with expertise in bankruptcy. If the result of this trade
involves a systematic transfer of value to specialized riskbearers, it could suggest that the liquidity provided to prebankruptcy creditors presents something of a trade-off. To
learn more about how selling claimholders fare, the author
studied the subsample of claims that he could price around
the petition date and near plan confirmation to measure the
market value of the distribution the claimholder receives
under the reorganization plan.
To make the comparison more realistic, marketadjusted returns were calculated for the buyer of claims
by assuming that the seller reinvests the proceeds of the
sale in an S&P 500 index fund on the same day that the
claim was sold and sells the index fund on the day the plan
is confirmed. The exhibit shows the percentage of trades
resulting in profit by the year the firm filed for bankruptcy.
For purposes of this exhibit, each bond in the dataset is
equally weighted, and the Y-axis shows the percentage of
all chapter 11 bonds issued by firms that filed for bankruptcy in each sample year that resulted in a market-adjusted
profit for the buyer. For example, 80 percent of the chapter 11 bonds that traded around the petition date for the
firms that filed for bankruptcy in 2002 offered marketadjusted profits to the buyer if the buyer bought the claim
on the petition date and sold it at the end of the bankruptcy
process for the then-market price.
As a threshold matter, the buyers of claims at the beginning of the bankruptcy process only do better than a selling
claimholder about 61 percent of the time. There also appears
to be a pattern in the data where hypothetical petition-date
purchasers do better than sellers when the economy is emerging from a recession, and sellers do better than purchasers
when the economy is doing well. This is consistent with
distressed-debt hedge funds bidding down returns in good
times, while the sheer supply of distressed debt in bad times
leads to large profits for skilled investors.
None of the evidence so far bears on perhaps the most
important question of all: What does all this activity
mean for bankruptcy governance? After all, bankruptcy
law is not terribly concerned with arm’s-length trades in
bankruptcy claims and whether buyers or sellers do better more often. What actually matters is how those trades
impact the way that chapter 11 is administered. Debtors
do not generally negotiate with all of the holders of a
bond issue; they negotiate with the activist investors who
seek to influence the bankruptcy case. While some large
investors might buy all of a bond issue on their own, for
the most part groups of funds participate in the bankruptcy case together as “ad hoc groups.” Rule 2019 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure requires these
ad hoc groups to file disclosure statements identifying,
among other things, the names of the group members and
how much they held.
In order to learn more about how ad hoc groups change
over the course of chapter 11, the author examined every
Rule 2019 statement filed by ad hoc groups holding bonds
continued on page 94
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for the firms in the sample.4 The initial sample of Rule 2019
consists of 100 Rule 2019 statements, of which the median
statement was filed 42 days into the bankruptcy case — on
average, around the time that DIP financing was approved.5
Rule 2019 requires ad hoc groups to file amended disclosure statements when the groups change. Of these initial
100 groups, 42 of them never filed an updated Rule 2019
statement. Of the groups that did file updates, the changes
to group composition and holdings tended to be relatively
slight, and very few groups changed in a material way over
the course of the chapter 11.
For the updating groups, the group members from the
original Rule 2019 statement held, on average, 86 percent of
the debt held by the final group in the last Rule 2019 statement filed with the court, showing that the initial group members nearly always remained in control of the ad hoc group
by the end of the case. Ad hoc groups tend not to acquire new
members, and the existing members rarely buy additional
debt during the bankruptcy case.6
4 This method certainly misses the cases where one hedge fund owns nearly all of the bond issue and
acts on their own, outside of the scaffolding of an ad hoc group. However, those cases are relatively rare,
and the case where that one investor then sells to another single investor are probably rarer still, so it is
unlikely that this biases the overall findings in a way that renders them unreliable.
5 There was a slight lag between the ad hoc group’s initial appearance in the case (on average, 24 days
after the petition date) and the filing of a Rule 2019 statement (on average, 42 days after the petition
date), so most groups were probably active and negotiating earlier than the initial Rule 2019 disclosure.

This finding presents a puzzle: How do we reconcile
the heavy level of trading in bond debt with the fact that
ad hoc groups tend to enter early and seldom change very
much by the end of the case? One hypothesis is that the
claims-trading occurring during a bankruptcy case is much
more about passive speculation than it is about influencing the outcome of the bankruptcy case. In other words,
claims-trading is less a route for activist entrance and exit,
and more an opportunity for nonactivist investors to make
passive investments. Of course, some of those nonactivist
funds might have the ability to become activists if it became
necessary to defend their claims. Moreover, the mere existence of a claims-trading market clearly casts a shadow on
the bankruptcy bargaining table.
In addition, the composition of creditor groups on the
petition date probably reflects the claims-trading that
occurred prior to the firm’s chapter 11 filing, meaning that
claims-trading is still important for bankruptcy governance.
However, the results in this study cast doubt on the argument that new regulation is needed in order to deal with the
churn created by claims-trading during the chapter 11 case
itself — in other words, there appears to be less churn than
was previously understood. abi
6 The study also examined the Rule 2019 statements filed by ad hoc groups holding loans (101 groups)
and found that these ad hoc groups also showed the same underlying patterns of group stability.
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